Academic

Yoo on Rational Choice and Treaty versus Executive Agreement Processes

By Lawrence Solum

John Yoo (University of California at Berkeley School of Law) has posted Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining (Cornell Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2011) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution?s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement?s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.

Highly recommended.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on March 17, 2011 (boomark / email).