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Interestingly, in accepting this view, some of the proponents conflated the traditional view with Islamic fundamentalism. In a sense, jurisprudence was grounded on politicalk assessment. "Ahmed El-Sayeh, a professor of Islamic philosophy at Al-Azhar University, strongly rebutted what he termed "the beliefs of some members of the centre which were inherited from extremist sects in pre-Islamic eras, underestimating the position of women." He stressed that Islam provides for full equality between men and women." Note the interesting way in which fundamentalist jurisprudence is sought to be discredited--by suggesting that those interpretations are not Islamic at all bit are somehow connected to the pagan practices of the pre-Islamic past. Thus stripped of their legitimacy, indeed stripped of their Islamic character, they are fair game. Even Western notions might provide more legitimate alternatives.

But there was great care to ensure that what was being discussed was error in understanding rather than a turn away from the holy word. "In her address, Radwan underlined the importance of correctly understanding the actual meanings of texts of the Quran and sayings of the Prophet Mohamed so as not to fall into error while implementing principles of Islamic Sharia. "The West criticises Islam because of incorrect practices that we claim as part of Islam. In reality, the error stems from our incorrect interpretation or implementation of principles of Islam," she added."

On the issue of the rights of non-Muslim widows of Muslim men, the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights compromised. They rejected the notion that non-Muslim widows could inherit, even if they lived in a Muslim household and reared Muslim children. However, they would be allowed something like charity. "Accordingly, after an extensive study of Radwan's suggestion, the IRC, while deciding not to allow non- Muslim wives to inherit Muslim husbands as there is no Quranic verse which stipulates such a situation, did agree on allocating a mandatory will to non-Muslim wives in order to enable them to lead an honourable life after their husband's death." Id.

But the National Council for Human Rights, of course, is not the last word on the matter. Shari'a, after all, is not a matter for consensus by committee, at least in the narrow sense. "Much of whether the new interpretation of women witnesses is accepted will depend on how the leaders of Al-Azhar and the Islamic Research Council (IRC) react. A majority of IRC members are backing Radwan." Id. The rationale is hardly flattering to women but effective all the same. "According to [Abdallah] El-Naggar, Islam accepted children's testimony as they have the ability to watch, observe and give information about a certain person or situation in order to preserve people's rights. "If Islam accepts children's testimony, then it would easily acknowledge that of a woman," argued El-Naggar." Id.

There are several insights worth considering bundled up in this reporting. These cut in a variety of directions. Together they continue to demonstrate both the power and flexibility of Islam as the basis of a system of jurisprudence complete in every way. But it also evidences the limits, sometimes severe of systems of political power grounded in religion and religious difference.

First, it appears that in places like Egypt, women and other groups might make better strides in attaining their political and human rights agendas by working through religious rather than secular law. While secular law and institutions remain a critical element, they play a secondary role. In this case, perhaps, the strength and weakness of secular are evident in the National Council for Human rights, which both provides a forum for otherwise marginalized segments of society, but at the same time can act only to give voice to issues requiring change.

Second, it appears that at least among some Islamic law may be more receptive to interpretation. However, the language and ambit of such interpretive flexibility is substantially narrower than under Western secular law (and likely closer to Western religious law in scope). Divinely inspired pronouncements cannot change, but they might be contextualized and reapplied properly. Additional pronouncements might be brought to bear, and certainly holes in jurisprudence may be filled. But this requires a constant working around existing unmovable jurisprudential objects. In some sense there is at least a faint smell of common law practice in this, though without equity or ecclesiastical realms as fail safes and escape routes.

Third, in the context in which there is no way around Divine command, the Egyptians have found a powerful tool for discrediting practices they wish to abandon--characterizing them as pagan in origin. While this interpretive approach has definite limits, it provides a means for overcoming a reluctance to change by separating custom from Divine command, and further separating post from pre-Islamic custom.

Fourth, the process for change is complex and ambiguous. Religious law is not subject to the same system of transparency, institutionalization and accountability of positive law making in secular states. In religio-legal systems, like those of Islam and its progenitor, Judaism, the lines of authority are not fixed. Reputation and power are critical components in this system. But again, there is a scent of the old common law in this as well--the opinions of Justice Holmes, for example, might be viewed as more authoritative, and more worthy of study, than those of his less well reputed colleagues on the Supreme Court. But the process and effect of reputation is hard to gauge and harder to control.

Fifth, and most difficult for outsiders, is that such jurisprudential turns, no matter how progressive it appears, will continue to draw a line and maintain the subordination, of non-believers--as a matter of religious law. Shari'a reminds us that subordination comes in all sorts of flavors. A Christian or Jewish person, like a woman or a child, will not have the same standing as a Muslim man. They cannot. This is not a deficiency of Islam and Shari'a, but rather its great strength as a religious foundation of law. But in a society that adheres to principles of equality before law, this necessary subordination does not serve all citizens equally. As the West, like the Middle East, moves closer to religiously based political organization, while purporting to remain true to a principle of equality, and as the West pushes a "soft Islam" on places like Turkey and Iraq, this very real tension may come to dominate political discourse, and this consequence may come to reshape the political organization of society.