Academic

But there were more tangible benefits as well--to both sides. The Chinese were able to exploit an event that took Western media activity away from Tibet and its search for independence,. Indeed, a great value of this gesture was to oppose the "stubbornness" of the Tibetan priestly aristocracy against the forward thinking actions of what had once been the most intimately connected and greatest poltiical enemy of the CCP and its plans for China. Of course, whether this strategy works or not remains to be seen, But certainly, from the CCP perpsective, it is something worth attempting. . .and the Western press might be understood as both fickle and to some extent gullable (but self aware). See, e.g., Rafael Poch, Primera Visita a China, en 60 Años, del Líder del Kuomintang taiwanés, La Vanguardia, May 29, 2008 ("Todo lo negativo que Pekín encajó a nivel de imagen con la crisis de Tibet, viene más que compensado por los progresos realizados en el muy sensible ámbito taiwanés," Id., at p. 6).

More importantly, for both sides, there was agreement on resumption of talks and resumption of some more extensive contacts. Hu Jintao

called for resuming exchanges and talks, based on the "1992 Consensus", between the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), as early as possible, and practically solving problems concerning the two sides through talks on equal footing. Once the ARATS-SEF dialogue is resumed, priority should be given to issues including cross-Strait weekend chartered flights and approval for mainland residents traveling to Taiwan, which are of the biggest concern to people on both sides of the Strait, said Hu.

There were internal benefits for the Taiwanese as well. Wu needs to present some tangible benefits to a policy of less provocation. And because of the extent of Taiwanese investment in China, something with economic impact would likely serve him best. At the same time, he must be careful to avoid reminding his CCP benefactors of his suggestion, during the campaign that the Taiwanese ought to be able to choose their own destiny. See, e.g., Rafael Poch, Primera Visita a China, en 60 Años, del Líder del Kuomintang taiwanés, La Vanguardia, May 29, 2008. Indeed, for this visit, Wu has been careful to emphasize the "correct" vision. "The KMT has won two important elections in Taiwan recently, Wu said, which showed that the mainstream opinion of the Taiwan people identified with what the KMT stood for, and most of the Taiwan people agree that the two sides on the strait can achieve peaceful development and a win-win situation." KMT Chairman Eyes Better Cross-Strait Relations, People's Daily On Line, May 31, 2008.

But Wu will have to tread carefully with but Hu and his electorate. The KMT forgets its own history on Taiwan at its peril. In a sense, some might argue that its own journey to Taiwan in the 1940s was a bit irregular, as was its imposition of government. It's relationship with the CCP, ancient, retains a certain ideological closeness that can be discerned even after nearly a century of bitter competition. For the CCP, the greatest victory, as well as a great irony, will be to have the KMT serve as its instrument in effecting reunification--both of territory and Party.