Academic

Legal Theory Bookworm

By Lawrence Solum

The Legal Theory Bookworm recommends Reasonably Vicious by Candace Vogler.  Here is the abstract:

Is unethical conduct necessarily irrational? Answering this question requires giving an account of practical reason, of practical good, and of the source or point of wrongdoing. By the time most contemporary philosophers have done the first two, they have lost sight of the third, chalking up bad action to rashness, weakness of will, or ignorance. In this book, Candace Vogler does all three, taking as her guides scholars who contemplated why some people perform evil deeds. In doing so, she sets out to at once engage and redirect contemporary debates about ethics, practical reason, and normativity.

Staged as a limited defense of a standard view of practical reason (an ancestor of contemporary instrumentalist views), Vogler's essay develops Aquinas's remark about three ways an action might be desirable into an exhaustive system for categorizing reasons for acting. Drawing on Elizabeth Anscombe's pioneering work on intention, Vogler argues that one sort (means/end or calculative reasons for acting) sets the terms for all sound work on practical rationality.

She takes up Aquinas's work on evil throughout, arguing that he provides us with a systematic theory of immorality that takes seriously the goods at issue in wrongdoing and the reasons for unethical conduct. Vogler argues that, shorn of its theological context, this theory leaves us with no systematic, uncontroversial way of arguing that wrongdoing is necessarily contrary to reason.

And from the reviews:

Vogler (philosophy, Univ. of Chicago) here defends what she terms the "standard view" of practical reasoning. To reason practically, according to this position, is to attempt to fit means to an end, or "parts of an activity in order to do the whole." Many contemporary philosophers have objected that this doctrine artificially separates reason and desire, making reason purely instrumental to desires that cannot be rationally evaluated. Vogler responds with a distinction: the standard view does not depend on controversial psychological premises, such as a bifurcation of reason and desire. Quite the contrary, it rests on a conceptual analysis of action. In carrying out her analysis, Vogler relies extensively on Aquinas's discussion of evil. Her account has the consequence that immoral action need not be irrational: an evil person can pursue his or her ends without manifesting a defect in rationality. Vogler shows a thorough knowledge of modern philosophers, such as Donald Davidson and Philippa Foot, who have discussed practical reason. Her subtle book is bound to be influential. Recommended for academic libraries.--David Gordon, Bowling Green State Univ., OH

Bravely, and with rather touching regret, [Vogler] sets herself against much current moral philosophy and shows just how difficult it is to avoid internalism if one is persuaded by the standard picture. In doing so, she challenges non-calculative theorists to pay closer attention to the structure of action and practical reason before they can hope to lay to rest the ghost of the reasonable villain."--Samantha Vice, Times Literary Supplement

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on January 24, 2009 (boomark / email).