Religion & Law

I appreciate Fr. Araujo's reflection on our common vocabulary and grammer (or lack thereof).  He writes that "our division appears to be attributable to whether we accept the truth or not about particular claims advanced by the Church."  I think that one can accept the truth of the Church's claims without concluding that a court that rejects those claims has substituted will for reason.  It is possible for two reason-employing people to disagree.  Perhaps the court has rejected reason, but that conclusion needs to be defended on its own merits, not by pointing out that the court has rejected the Christian (or traditional) view of marriage.  This relates to the point about the religious basis for a ban on same-sex marriage.  The court did end up embracing a view of marriage espoused by some religious believers, but it did not do so based on the religious believers' espousal of it.  The court did so through arguments that it perceived to be reasonable.  It discounted the traditional religious view of marriage because, in the court's estimation, the exercise of reason could not justify that view.