Ethics

The possibility of professional discipline for John Edwards has sparked some interesting debates elsewhere, and there's one particular question I'd like to raise here.  Some observers, including some participants on this blog, have cast doubt on the relevance of dishonesty in one's personal life to the inclination toward dishonesty in one's representation of clients.  That is, as John Steele suggested in his earlier post, the fact that Edwards lied about his adultery and resulting child does not mean that he will lie in his representation of clients.  I'm willing to go along with that particular claim, but I'm not sure how far to take it.

I agree with John Steele that discipline might be appropriate if Edwards would have lied to defy campaign finance laws.  But that conclusion must derive from an implicit belief that respect for the law is categorically different than dishonesty when it comes to his fitness to practice law.  Consider a violation of law that involves an even more "personal" issue: let's say that Edwards had defied child support orders from the court.  Is there any research establishing that a willingness to violate the law in one situation indicates a willingness to violate the law in other situations?  (I.e., is a willingness to violate the law "cross-situationally stable?")  If we don't have that evidence, on what basis would Edwards' willingness to violate the law in his personal life justify professional discipline?  Or is respect for the law such a bedrock value of the profession that we don't care if there is a link; we're instead sending the message that lawyers respect the law, period.  In this regard, does the character and fitness inquiry have a pedagogical dimension?  Should it?