Personal Injury Law

Court's Decision on CR 12(b)(6) Motion In Zupnik: FFDCA Preemption Under Further Attack and Twombly Ignored

By Kenneth Odza

We previously cited the motion to dismiss in Zupnik, et al. v. Tropicana Products, Inc. as an example of good pleading practice in a putative consumer fraud class case. United States District Judge Dale S. Fischer apparently disagreed with our assessment, this week issuing an order denying the motion.

Tropicana's lead argument was a failure of pleading. Tropicana attacked the complaint both on the basis of Rule 9(b), and under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Twombly. The Twombly decision requires the federal court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to determine whether operative factual allegations are 'plausible' and more than simply 'conclusory.'

Judge Fischer rejected summarily Rule 9(b) arguments. She completely disregarded Tropicana's Twombly arguments, failing even to mention the Supreme Court's decision.

Tropicana also moved to dismiss based on federal preemption. Most of Judge Fischer's decision is devoted to the preemption argument. She ruled that since California's Sherman Law is substantively identical to 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) of the FFDCA, the preemption argument fails.

Judge Fischer theorized that even though plaintiffs could not point to anything on Tropicana's label that violated any FDA regulation, the FDA could bring an enforcement action 'to target specific false or misleading labels.' If the FDA can bring that kind of action under 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), plaintiffs, according to Judge Fischer, should also be able to bring a private right of action under the identical California law. Query whether Judge Fischer's reasoning negates any FFDCA preemption defense to a claim brought under California's Sherman Act? 

Full post as published by Food Liability Law Blog on February 04, 2010 (boomark / email).