Constitutional Law

Four More Decisions!

The Supreme Court handed down four decisions today: Kennedy v. Louisiana, striking down the death penalty for child rape; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, limiting punitive damages in maritime cases; Giles v. California, curtailing an exception to the Confrontation Clause; and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., restricting Tribal jurisdiction in reservation land-sales by nonmembers of the tribe.

Kennedy v. Louisiana
In Kennedy v. Louisiana, a split 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that, under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty cannot apply to crimes against individuals that do not end with or intend the death of the victim. Specifically, the Court held the Constitution prohibits the death penalty for the crime of child rape where the crime did not, and was not intended to, end in the death of the child. After examining the practice of states and death penalty statistics and finding no support for pro-death penalty arguments, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, turned to precedent and the Court’s own judgment.  

He reasoned that applying the death penalty would not balance the wrong done to the victim, noted the particular evidentiary problems with often-unreliable child testimony, and voiced the concern that applying the death penalty to non-murder crimes might cause the perpetrator to commit murder to hide the crime. The Court distinguished between crimes against the State (like treason) and crimes against individuals.  Justice Samuel Alito authored the dissent, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas. AP coverage here. 

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court held that the $2.5 billion damages claim against Exxon for its 1989 oil spill in Alaska must be reduced. The Court split evenly 4-4 on whether maritime law allows punitive damages to be imposed against companies for the acts of their agents, but concurred unanimously that the punitive damages as upheld by the Ninth Circuit were excessive under maritime common law.

The Court rejected an argument by Exxon that the Clean Water Act  preempted common law punitive damage claims. Justice David Souter authored the opinion, holding that punitive damages were to be limited to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages; in this case, $507.5 million. All Justices except Justice Alito concurred in the judgment; he took no part in the consideration or decision.  ACSBlog previewed the arguments. Wall Street Journal Blog has more.

Giles v. California
In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court held a criminal defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser when his wrongful act kept a witness away from trial, unless the the defendant intended the act to have that effect. The Court struck down a California court’s broad interpretation of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause. The California court had removed the intent element from the common law exception, holding that statements by witnesses unavailable at trial could be introduced if the judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant has kept the witness away from trial, even if keeping the witness away from trial was not the purpose of the act. 

Justice Scalia, writing in a 6-1-3 decision, stated that since the broader exception was not present at the Founding, and not established in American jurisprudence since, it is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The question of the defendant's intent is an open question to be determined on remand to the lower court. The case revolved around a domestic violence killing, and domestic violence is often perpetrated with the intent to keep a the victim from going to trial, so the statements may make it into the trial record regardless. Justices Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.
In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court held 5-4 that Tribal Courts do not have jurisdiction to regulate the sale of reservation land owned in fee simple by nonmembers of the tribe.  Once the land has been sold in fee simple to a nonmember, that fee parcel ceases to be tribal land.

The Tribe, under Montana v. United States, is only able to regulate conduct of nonmembers rising from relationships between members and nonmembers, like contracts and licensing, or when the conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and wellness of the tribe.”

The Supreme Court ruled that the harm was already done when the land was sold to the Bank fifty years ago, and further sale from nonmember to nonmember did no further damage within the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction. The Long’s claim of discrimination sprung from this second land sale, and was therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. Seeking the Tribal Court’s aid in serving process upon the Long family was not enough to subject the Bank to the Tribe’s jurisdiction. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, arguing that a damage award springing from the Long’s claim of discrimination should stand. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined the dissenting opinion.  AP coverage here.

Full post as published by ACS Blog on June 25, 2008 (boomark / email).