Federal Judiciary

An Old Strategy, a New Election -- By: Jim Geraghty

In an above-the-fold story on Sunday, the Washington Post couldn?t hide its skepticism: ?As political gambles go, it?s a big and risky one: $50 million to test the proposition that the Democratic Party?s outreach to new voters that helped make Barack Obama president can work in an election where his name is not on the ballot.?

The report, from staff writer Karen Tumulty, suggested the massive expenditure was the Democrats? response to big GOP wins in New Jersey and Virginia in 2009:

Although the president stumped for the party?s nominees in both states, voter falloff was sharper than typical for an off-year election. Several private post-election analyses, which Democrats and their allies are using to plan their campaign strategies, showed that the decline was particularly steep among African Americans, Hispanics and, especially, younger voters.#...#Party officials concede that their efforts to re-motivate the new Obama voters are not likely to affect contests where Democrats are running far behind. But they insist it is not unreasonable to believe they can make a difference in races that will be decided by two to four percentage points.

The skepticism is warranted. A push to bring out ?African Americans, Hispanics and, especially, younger voters? in a midterm election might work, but it will face several significant challenges.

For starters, the entire concept rests on the notions that (A) Obama?s candidacy drove a uniquely large spike in turnout among Democratic voters, and (B) once the party figures out how to replicate the alchemy of the Obama campaign?s get-out-the-vote efforts, it can get similar results in off-year elections.

But presidential election turnout didn?t really jump that dramatically from 2004 to 2008, at least not by historical standards. It increased from 122 million to 135 million, 7.5 percent. But from 1996 to 2000, turnout increased from 96 million to 105 million (9.5 percent), and from 2000 to 2004, it increased from 105 million to 122 million (16 percent). From 1972 to 2008, turnout grew an average of 5.5 percent per presidential election, declining only in 1988 and 1996.

And there is no evidence that the Democrats have learned to apply the lessons of the Obama campaign to off-year elections. First came the disappointments of 2009. And so far this year, Democratic-primary turnout in many key states has been pretty lousy by historical standards. In Ohio, 673,597 voted in their Democratic primary; that?s down from 747,404 in 2006 and 934,891 in 1994. (Presidential-year primary turnout is usually significantly higher, and thus is not terribly useful as a comparison.) In North Carolina, 423,453 voters cast ballots in the Democratic primary, compared with 645,070 in a contested Democrat Senate primary in 2002 and 540,031 in a Senate primary in 1998. In Pennsylvania, even with the headline-grabbing fight between Joe Sestak and party-switcher Arlen Specter, the 1.05 million Democrats who turned out pale in comparison with the 1.24 million who turned out for the last hotly contested statewide Democratic race, the gubernatorial fight that Ed Rendell won in 2002. Turnout in the primaries does not necessarily predict turnout in November, but these are some rather ominous indicators.

A Republican who is watching the battle for the House closely thinks that the Democrats? new plan ignores the fundamental fact that the electoral environment of 2008 can never be recreated. ?A lot of factors went into the Democrats? turnout in 2008: the history of electing the first African-American president, the hope and change stuff, anger at Bush, fear about the economy,? he says. ?Since then, they?ve been losing ground among soft Republicans, independents, and soft Democrats. The Democratic base is shrinking.?

He concludes, ?money can only do so much,? and a like-minded poll-watching source concurs, pointing to two 2009 results: New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg spent $102 million -- outspending his closest opponent 14-to-1 -- only to win reelection by a small margin, and Gov. Jon Corzine outspent Chris Christie 2-to-1 in New Jersey, only to lose by four percentage points.

Then there?s the major issue of geographic dispersal. The targeted demographics of young voters, African-Americans, and Hispanics aren?t spread out evenly across the map, and are in short supply in some of the places where Democrats are most likely to lose seats. One has to wonder how much a surge among these groups would help an endangered House Democrat like Jason Altmire in Pennsylvania?s Fourth Congressional District, which is 93 percent white and has the ninth-highest median age in the country (42.6 years).

In fact, only about half the competitive districts have large minority populations or encompass major campuses. The Democrats? effort will do little for their chances in open-seat races in New Hampshire?s First Congressional District (95 percent white), Tennessee?s Sixth (85.8 percent white), or Washington?s Third (85.7 percent white). The Democratic push will similarly have little impact for Ike Skelton in Missouri?s Fourth (91 percent white), Charlie Wilson in Ohio?s Sixth (94.6 percent white), John Boccieri in Ohio?s 16th (91.8 percent white), Zack Space in Ohio?s 18th (95.5 percent white), Kathy Dahlkemper in Pennsylvania?s Third (93 percent white), Patrick Murphy in Pennsylvania?s Eighth (88.9 percent white), Chris Carney in Pennsylvania?s Tenth (93.9 percent white), or Paul Kanjorski in Pennsylvania?s Eleventh (88.6 percent white). It will be of limited use for embattled incumbents like Earl Pomeroy, in 90 percent-white North Dakota, where the incumbent already trails, or in 86.5 percent white South Dakota, where Stephanie Herseth Sandlin also trails. (The above districts have colleges and universities in them, but none are demographically dominated by their campuses the way Ann Arbor, Mich.; Columbus, Ohio; or Charlottesville, Va., are.)

Looking at the 26 Democrat-held House districts currently rated ?toss up? by the Cook Political Report, one can see the logic of the Democrats? approach; almost all of them have 10 to 20 percent ethnic minorities or a major college campus. But it?s supremely unclear that boosting turnout by these groups by a few percentage points will be enough. Can a big turnout among Hispanics in freshman Suzanne Kosmas?s district -- where they make up 14 percent of the population -- offset the voters furious about job losses along the Space Coast? Can the 11 percent of voters in Frank Kratovil?s Maryland who are African-American turn out in enough numbers to save him when a poll taken late last year showed Kratovil down 13? Can the University of New Hampshire save Carol Shea-Porter when she?s already trails a likely GOP challenger and has a 50 percent disapproval rating? It is possible, but it?s not easy to envision.

As for the Senate, the Cook Political Report ranks ten races as toss-ups. Here?s how they stack up demographically:

Nevada: 58.9 percent white
Florida: 61 percent white
Colorado: 71 percent white
Washington: 76 percent white
Arkansas: 76 percent white
Pennsylvania: 82 percent white
Missouri: 82.4 percent white
Ohio: 82.8 percent white
Kentucky 88.1 percent white
New Hampshire: 93.4 percent white

In other words, the Democrats are committing $50 million to an effort that will reach only the college students among the above large slices of the electorate in ten key states. They?ll need massive turnout among these targeted groups, and for other efforts to keep down the GOP?s margin among white voters.

Fred Wszolek, a veteran GOP consultant working with Dan Benishek in Michigan?s First Congressional District, sees some logic to the strategy: ?There are 15 million first-time voters that they?re looking at. Let?s assume that they?re targeting a third of those, the ones who live in key states or targeted districts. That?s ten bucks per person that they?re going to target. That?s a lot of mail, phone calls, and personal contacts you can buy. Will that get every one of them to the polls? Of course not. Will it get a whole bunch of them to the polls? Sure. This may well be the very best way the Democrats could actually spend that 50 million -- which is a strong measure of how screwed they are.?

Wszolek thinks all of this may amount to an expensive but small mitigation of a massive GOP wave: ?What?s most striking to me is the map we?re looking at. We have a great shot at both the governor?s office and Senate seat in California. Same in Illinois. We?re coming back in New Hampshire, and our Senate candidate is Delaware is the odds-on favorite. The Rust Belt is going to take a big swing to the right too. We might score gains in the Pacific Northwest. You know what that map looks like? The battleground for George Bush -- in 1988. It?s like we?ve gone back in time 22 years. And that?s why this $50 million gambit will ultimately be unsuccessful. The Left has generated a backlash capable of undoing a two-decade trend with the middle of the electorate, and a GOTV campaign in their base isn?t going to fix it.?

-- Jim Geraghty writes the Campaign Spot on NRO.

Full post as published by Bench Memos - National Review Online on June 22, 2010 (boomark / email).