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: Law Library LetterSummary 2010 WY 51
Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Case Name: Fayard v. Design Comm. of Homestead Subdivision
Citation: 2010 WY 51
Docket Number: S-09-0145
Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.
Representing Appellant Fayard and Galeforce: Paula A. Fleck and Susan L. Combs of Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee Design Committee of the Homestead Div.: James K. Lubing of Law Office of James K. Lubing, Jackson, Wyoming; Douglas F. Schultz of Schultz Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.
Facts/Discussion: Fayard and Galeforce (Fayard) own lots in the Homestead Subdivision in Teton County. Fayard filed a declaratory judgment and injunctive action against the Design Committee and committee members, alleging the committee had improperly approved a special assessment to pave the common roads. Lots in the Homestead Subdivision are governed by a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CCRs.)
Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and interpreted in accordance with principles of contract law. If the contractual language is clear, the court interprets it as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate. The committee argued that it acted within its authority to present the special assessment question to the lot owners because the unpaved roads presented an unusual condition that had arisen with regard to the access facilities or utilities which service the property. Fayard argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because the term ?unusual? was broad and that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether an ?unusual condition? existed to justify paving the roads.
The fact that the covenants did not provide any limitations on what could be considered ?unusual? indicated the declarant intended that the special assessment process apply to a wide variety of circumstances. The declarant?s use of the term did not mean the contract was ambiguous.
Conclusion: The ?unusual condition? basis for imposing a special assessment under the CCRs was intentionally broad and the undisputed facts presented fell within that definition. There were no genuine issues of material fact and the contract was properly interpreted by the district court as a matter of law. The Design Committee acted within its authority under the CCRs in imposing the special assessment for paving the roads.
Affirmed.
J. Kite delivered the decision.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/2bspuma .
[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance using the Universal Citation format, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Full post as published by Law Library Letter on April 23, 2010 (boomark / email).

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