State Law

The company argues Smith failed to state a claim for injuries under the wrongful death act because the bases of his claims were adjudicated fully on the merits against his wife during her lifetime. It contends Smith failed to prove that any lack of warning before 1969 ? when federal law began requiring cigarette companies to put warning labels on cigarettes ? caused his wife's death. The company asserts that Smith failed to identify or prove a specific defect in the design of Kool cigarettes that rendered them defective or unreasonably dangerous in a way that caused his wife's death. It further asserts that his claims based on the inherent risks of cigarettes are barred by federal conflict preemption and that, because the dangers of smoking are commonly known, Smith failed to show the company owed any duty to his wife. The company argues the evidence presented did not support a comparative fault instruction; it did not assert comparative fault as an affirmative defense and did not try comparative fault by implied consent. The company contends the evidence did not show that its conduct that allegedly caused Smith wife's death was tantamount to intentional wrongdoing and, therefore, punitive damages should not be awarded. The company asserts that the punitive damages award exceeds the amount permissible under the due process clause of the United States constitution because it is not supported by evidence of commensurate degree of reprehensibility in the company's conduct, the 40-to-1 ration between the punitive damages and the substantial compensatory damages awarded Smith is far greater than due process permits, and the punitive damages award greatly exceeds the civil penalties authorized in comparable cases.

Smith responds that the trial court properly overruled the company's motions for directed verdict at the close of evidence and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. He argues that the dismissal with prejudice in federal court of his wife's estate's survival action did not constitute a full and final adjudication on the merits of her estate's beneficiaries' wrongful death action and that the federal court's partial grant of summary judgment also does not constitute a full and final adjudication. Smith contends that the estate's dismissal of the survival action did not act as an adjudication of the beneficiaries' wrongful death action and that adjudication of a few claims against his wife does not preclude her heirs from maintaining a wrongful death action. He asserts this case's procedural history shows that the company strongly supported and even stipulated to the beneficiaries' future ability to maintain a wrongful death action. Smith argues the federal court's order memorialized the estate's agreement to dismiss its survival action with prejudice in return for the company's promise not to use that dismissal as a legal defense to a future wrongful death action such as the one here. He contends the company's interpretation of the state's wrongful death act would defeat its legislative purpose. Smith asserts that he is entitled to a legal presumption that an adequate warning would have been heeded and that he presented overwhelming evidence both that the company's failure to warn caused his wife's death as well as of the unreasonable danger of Kool cigarettes. He further asserts the danger of Kool cigarettes were knot commonly known during the time his wife smoked. He argues Missouri law does not require evidence of a safer alternative design to establish a strict liability product defect claim. Smith contends the United States Supreme Court has held that federal law does not preempt product defect and negligent design claims in an individual smoker's case. Smith responds that the trial court properly instructed the jury on comparative fault. He notes that the company pleaded comparative fault as an affirmative defense, used this defense to obtain substantial discovery and litigated the issue of his wife's comparative fault before the jury. Smith responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence on the company's concealment during the compensatory damages phase or in refusing the company's proposed instructions regarding punitive damages. He argues the company's previous failure to argue the punitive damages claims were not submissible waived its right to appellate review."

Full post as published by Showmeblawgs on February 17, 2008 (boomark / email).